Case study · 1987
The largest single-day percentage drop in history. No rule catches a one-day crash, but the signal limited the damage and stepped aside for the aftermath.
Sectors moved to cash as trends broke after the October crash, with T-bills paying 6 to 7% while the strategy waited. Roughly half the market’s drawdown.
From the peak in August 1987 to the bottom that December, an investor holding the whole market lost about 33% of their money, dividends included, and did not get back to even until May 1989. Over that same stretch the worst our strategy ever fell was about 16%, roughly half the market’s drawdown, for a simple reason: each sector steps out of the market when its own trend turns down, and waits in safe Treasury bills until the trend turns back up.
Black Monday was a single-day crash: it arrived before any trend had broken, so the strategy was still largely invested and took a similar first hit. What happened next is the difference. As sector trends broke, the rule moved those slices to cash, held the damage near 16%, and collected 6 to 7% Treasury bill interest while it waited. When trends repaired, it stepped back in. The rule does not dodge a bolt from the blue, but it does keep a bad day from becoming a bad year.
The strategy climbed back above its August 1987 starting line in April 1989, while the market was still about 2% underwater. The methodology and caveats are the same as our 1929 sector study, and are spelled out in that research note.
The point of a rule is to act before the worst of a decline and, just as important, to signal when to step back into the market in a systematic way once the trend repairs itself. No forecast, no emotion. See how the framework works.